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As the legal mechanisms supporting the antidiscrimination princi-
ple' have developed, a system of heightened judicial protection for
disempowered minorities or "suspect classes" has emerged as a
powerful tool.2 Legally recognized suspect classes include classes
defined by the characteristics of race, 3 ethnicity, 4 and, to somewhat
lesser extents, gender, 5 alienage,6 and illegitimacy. 7 American law
has made great strides in recognizing and protecting suspect classes
defined by a single characteristic (such as race), and also in protect-
ing "double-suspect classes," that is, classes defined by a combina-
tion of suspect characteristics (such as race and gender).8 A
significant problem still remains, however, regarding the appropri-
ate legal response to cases that involve a combination of suspect and
non-suspect characteristics. For example, a claim of discrimination
against overweight women would involve a combination of gender,
a suspect characteristic, and weight, a non-suspect characteristic.
The thesis of this Current Topic is that an ostensibly non-suspect
characteristic may be transformed, through a process of stereotyp-
ing, into a vehicle for discrimination against a suspect class. For
instance, stereotypic images of women may dictate a narrower range
of acceptable body weights for women than for men, and women
whose weight exceeds the acceptable range may suffer a form of
1. For a discussion of the meaning and structure of the antidiscrimination principle,
see Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 107, 108-17
(1976). See also Brest, Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90
Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1976).
2. For a discussion of theories regarding the central function of suspect classification
doctrine, see Lawrence, The Id, The Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Uncon-
scious Racism, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 317, 344-55 (1987).
3. See, e.g., Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954); see also Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
4. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954).
5. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
6. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365
(1971).
7. See, e.g., Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S. 1 (1983); Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978).
8. See Scales-Trent, Black Women and the Constitution: Finding Our Place, Assert-
ing Our Rights,forthcoming in 24 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. (1989).
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stigmatization distinct from that suffered by overweight men. 9 In
such a case, the non-suspect characteristic, weight, is transformed
into a discriminatory criterion.
Current antidiscrimination law lacks a comprehensive theory
under which to recognize discrimination stemming from such stere-
otypic transformation of a non-suspect criterion. This Current
Topic offers a theory for consistent legal cognition of that form of
discrimination. This theory is based upon a recognition that the
stereotypic meaning of characteristics may be transformed by their
combination with other characteristics and that, through that trans-
formative dynamic, even a non-suspect characteristic may function
as a discriminatory criterion.
Section I discusses transformative stereotyping of double-suspect
classes (such as black women). Section II examines transformative
stereotyping involving a combination of suspect and non-suspect
characteristics (such as overweight women). Section III explores
the special problems raised when the transformed non-suspect char-
acteristic is a personality trait (such as "pushy" women). Finally,
Section IV demonstrates that the two traditional modes of establish-
ing liability for discrimination, disparate impact analysis and dis-
criminatory treatment analysis, are readily applicable to
discrimination stemming from transformative stereotyping.
L Transformative Stereotyping of Double-Suspect Classes
Legal recognition of double-suspect classes, that is, classes de-
fined by a combination of suspect characteristics, is now relatively
unproblematic.' 0 Federal courts have recognized that a double-sus-
pect class is, afortiori, a suspect class."
For example, in Jefferies v. Harris County Community Action Associa-
tion, t2 the class "black women" was recognized as a distinct suspect
9. See infra text accompanying notes 24-31.
10. In the past, some courts declined to recognize double-suspect classes as distinct
suspect classes and allowed a defendant successfully to defend against claims of discrim-
ination involving a double-suspect class (e.g., black women) by showing that he or she
did not discriminate against each of the constituent classes (blacks and women). See, e.g.,
DeGraffenreid v. General Motors Assembly Div., 413 F. Supp. 142, 143 (E.D. Mo. 1976),
afd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 558 F.2d 480, 484 (8th Cir. 1977). That ap-
proach has not prevailed.
11. See, e.g., Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406 (10th Cir. 1987); Jefferies v.
Harris County Community Action Ass'n, 615 F.2d 1025 (5th Cir. 1980);Judge v. Marsh,
649 F. Supp. 770 (D.D.C. 1986); Graham v. Bendix Corp., 585 F. Supp. 1036 (D. Ind.
1984).




class. Jefferies brought a Title VII l3 discrimination action against
the Harris County Community Action Association (HCCAA) alleg-
ing that HCCAA, in denying Jefferies's application for promotion to
a "field representative" position, had discriminated against her "be-
cause she is a woman .. .and because she is Black."' 4 The Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals observed that "discrimination against
black females can exist even in the absence of discrimination against
black men or white women."' 15 The Fifth Circuit was correct in
pointing out that discrimination against a double-suspect class (such
as black women) can exist even in the absence of discrimination
based on the constitutive characteristics of that class (such as black-
ness or femaleness). Such particularized discrimination is possible
because discrimination is mediated by stereotyping. Stereotypes
function as the interpretative step between an individual's percep-
tion of a given characteristic, e.g., race, and the individual's discrim-
inatory behavior on the basis of that characteristic. Because the
stereotype of a double-suspect class may be distinct from the stereo-
type of either of its constitutive classes, the double-suspect class may
be subject to discrimination distinct from that suffered by its consti-
tutive classes.
To put this point differently, stereotypes are characterizations of a
group.' 6 Those characterizations define the "appropriate," often
discriminatory, response to members of the stereotyped group. If
you ask a person who is prejudiced against blacks why she dislikes or
fears blacks, the answer is unlikely to be: "They're black." Rather,
the more likely response is a description of the stereotypic charac-
teristics-particularly the personality characteristics--of blacks.
These stereotypic characterizations purport to justify the subse-
quent discriminatory treatment of blacks. 17 For example, a charac-
terization such as "blacks are violent" might be the basis of an
individual's fear of blacks and preference not to live in a neighbor-
hood with blacks. In this way, stereotypic characterizations provide
13. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (1982).
14. Jefferies, 615 F.2d at 1029.
15. Jefferies, 615 F.2d at 1032. On appeal after remand, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the
District Court's holding that, even when the class "Black women" was considered a dis-
tinct suspect class, the particulars ofJefferies' case did not make out a sustainable Title
VII claim. SeeJefferies v. Harris County Community Action Ass'n, 693 F.2d 589 (1982).
16. See Miller, Historical and Contemporary Perspectives on Stereotyping, in In the
Eye of the Beholder 29 (A. Miller ed. 1982) (discussing various definitions of
stereotyping).
17. See LeVine & Campbell, Ethnocentrism 158 (1972); Morris & Williamson, Ste-
reotypes and Social Class: A Focus on Poverty, in In the Eye of the Beholder 448 (A.
Miller ed. 1982).
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the cognitive connection linking the group characteristic (race) to
discriminatory treatment of that group.' 8
In a double-suspect class stereotype, the stereotypic meaning of
each of the characteristics defining the class is transformed by its
combination with the other constitutive characteristics. That trans-
formation produces a new and distinct stereotype specific to the
double-suspect class in question. For example, the stereotypic
meaning of "Jew" (usually a male image)' 9 is transformed when
Jewishness is combined with femaleness.20 The stereotype of "a
Jew" (e.g., Shylock2' or Portnoy22 ) is different from that of ajewish
woman (e.g., Shylock's daughter or Portnoy's mother).
Similarly, the stereotypes attached to the double-suspect class
"black women" are specific to that double-suspect class; they are not
just the sum of the stereotypes attached to the constituent character-
istics black and female. 23 It is because the stereotypes of double-
suspect classes are distinct from those of their constitutive classes
that, in Jefferies, HCCAA could be willing to hire both women and
blacks, but not black women, as field representatives. The stereo-
typic meaning of each constitutive characteristic is transformed
when the characteristics are combined in a double-suspect class.
18. The Supreme Court has recognized the need to address the phenomenon of
stereotyping in order to deal effectively with the problem of discrimination. Writing for
the Court in Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, Justice O'Connor noted, "Care
must be taken in ascertaining whether the statutory objective itself reflects archaic and
stereotypic notions." 458 U.S. 718, 725 (1982). In a recent gender discrimination case,
the Court commented on its holding by observing that, were it to hold otherwise, "the
problem of subconscious stereotypes and prejudices would remain." Watson v. Fort
Worth Bank & Trust, 108 S. Ct. 2777, 2786 (1988). The Court thus expressed its con-
cern with the role of stereotyping-even unconscious stereotyping-in discrimination.
For a discussion of the largely unconscious nature of stereotyping and the implica-
tions of unconscious prejudice for antidiscrimination law, see Lawrence, supra note 2.
19. See G. Rothbell, The Case of the Jewish M-other: A Study in Stereotyping, ch. 9
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, S.U.N.Y. at Stony Brook) (1988).
20. Id.
21. See W. Shakespeare, The Merchant of Venice (Oxford University Press, 1957).
22. See P. Roth, Portnoy's Complaint (1967).
23. For example, in contrast to the stereotype of black men as lazy and shiftless and
the stereotype ofJAPs, see infra note 47 and accompanying text, as spoiled and idle, black
women have often been stereotyped as hard-working and long-suffering mothers hold-
ing one or more jobs to support their children. That stereotype may have been largely
replaced in recent years with the image of the black welfare mother. Neither stereotype
evokes an image of an elegant or even attractive woman. Hiring black women is, there-





II. Transformative Stereotyping: Combinations of Suspect
and Non-Suspect Characteristics
The same transformation of stereotypic meaning that occurs in
stereotypes of double-suspect classes also takes place when a sus-
pect characteristic is combined with a non-suspect characteristic.
Just as the meaning of each constituent element in a double-suspect
class is transformed by its combination with the other elements, a
non-suspect characteristic's meaning is transformed by its combina-
tion with a suspect characteristic.
An example of this type of stereotypic transformation was
presented in Gerdom v. Continental Airlines.24 Gerdom was fired from
her job as a flight attendant when she became overweight according
to height/weight standards set by the airline.2 5 Obviously, it was not
Gerdom's suspect characteristic (her femaleness) that caused her
dismissal, since she was able to retain her job until she became
"overweight." Therefore, one might think that her dismissal was
based upon weight, a non-suspect characteristic. 26 Judge Sneed,
writing for the court in Gerdom I, applied that line of reasoning when
he observed, "Continental's weight requirements have not excluded
women as a class from jobs as flight attendants. Some women have
24. The procedural history of this case is important to note. The United States Dis-
trict Court for the Central District of California entered summary judgment for the de-
fendants in 1978, and the plaintiffs appealed. I will refer to this appeal (Gerdom v.
Continental Airlines, 648 F.2d 1223 (9th Cir. 1981)) as Gerdom I. In Gerdom I, the court
reversed in part, affirmed in part, ordered certification of the plaintiffs class, and re-
manded to the district court. The case, however, did not return to the district court at
that point. Rather, the plaintiffs petitioned for and were granted en banc consideration.
I will refer to this en banc appeal (Gerdom v. Continental Airlines, 692 F.2d 602 (9th
Cir. 1982) (en banc), cert. dismissed, 460 U.S. 1074 (1983)) as Gerdom I.
25. In 1971, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that exclusion of men from
employment as flight attendants violated Title VII. Diaz v. Pan American World Air-
ways, 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971). Prior to that 1971 hold-
ing, Continental had employed only women as flight attendants.
During the period when Continental flight attendants were exclusively female, Conti-
nental required that its "flight hostesses" maintain their weight below maximum weights
specified on their height/weight chart. In 1973, in the wake of the Diaz decision, as
Continental began to employ men as flight attendants, Continental abandoned its
height/weight chart and, thereafter, required only that flight attendants maintain their
weight in a "reasonable relationship to their height, bone structure, and age." Gerdom I,
648 F.2d at 1225.
In Gerdom I, the plaintiffs challenged both the pre-1973 weight requirements based on
the height/weight chart, and the post-1973 "reasonable weight" requirements. In
Gerdom H, the court considered only the pre-1973 requirements.
26. For a discussion of the general problem of weight discrimination, see Comment,
The Rehabilitation Act of 1973: Protection for Victims of Weight Discrimination?, 29
UCLA L. Rev. 947 (1982).
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been excluded, but that exclusion has been on the basis of weight
only." 2 7
The flaw in Judge Sneed's reasoning is the failure to recognize
that the stereotypic meaning of the non-suspect characteristic
"overweight" is transformed by its combination with the suspect
characteristic, female. Rather than recognizing the transformation
of the non-suspect characteristic, the Gerdom I court allowed the in-
troduction of the non-suspect characteristic, weight, to mask the in-
fluence of the suspect characteristic, gender. Judge Sneed allowed
the introduction of the non-suspect characteristic to obscure the fact
that the suspect characteristic still exerted influence. He did not ac-
knowledge that "overweight" may have a different meaning when
the weight is on a woman than when it is on a man.28 The range of
"acceptable" weights may be narrower for women; weight and body
shape may be more central to evaluation of the physical attractive-
ness of women; and physical attractiveness may be more central to
evaluation of the overall worth of women or, certainly, their worth
as flight attendants.2 9 The court in Gerdom I failed to recognize that
when the stereotypic meaning of "overweight" is transformed by its
combination with "woman," the application of the transformed
meaning of "overweight" as an employment criterion is a form of
gender discrimination.
Upon en banc consideration in Gerdom II, the Ninth Circuit re-
jected the reasoning of Gerdom I. The Gerdom II court implicitly rec-
ognized the transformation of the non-suspect characteristic,
weight. The court observed that Continental's weight policy "was
enforced only against women because it was not merely slenderness,
but slenderness of female employees which Continental considered
critical." 0 The Gerdom H court thus found Continental liable for
27. 648 F.2d at 1226.
28. The fact that added flexibility in weight standards was introduced upon the de-
segregation of the occupation supports the notion that "overweight" for women carries
different connotations from "overweight" for men.
29. This transformative dynamic was implicitly acknowledged in Note, Facial Dis-
crimination: Extending Handicap Law to Employment Discrimination on the Basis of
Physical Appearance, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 2035 (1987). "Some individual victims of ap-
pearance discrimination who are also members of other, protected groups may find pro-
tection under race, sex, or age discrimination statutes." Id. at 2042. An example of such
a case was heard before the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). An
interviewer had commented in his written report that the applicant, who was black, had
"unattractive, large lips." E.E.O.C. Decision No. 70-90, Case No. 6-2-1079, 1973
E.E.O.C. Decisions (CCH) No. 41, T6065 (Aug. 19, 1969). The EEOC found that the
comment constituted a reasonable basis for belief that racial discrimination had
occurred.




gender discrimination. Yet the court did so without articulating the
theory of transformative stereotyping on which its holding was im-
plicitly based. 31 Because recognition of the transformative dynamic
has never been made explicit and incorporated into the body of
antidiscrimination doctrine, courts have often failed to provide pro-
tection against this form of discrimination. 32 Federal courts have
decided several cases other than Gerdom involving combinations of
suspect and non-suspect characteristics. Even when courts find dis-
crimination in such cases, the courts,' opinions often reflect a failure
to recognize the transformation of the non-suspect characteristic.
For example, in Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp.,3 3 an employer re-
fused to hire mothers of pre-school children but hired fathers of
pre-school children. Based on a theory prohibiting disparate treat-
ment of men and women, the Court held it impermissible for the
employer to have "one hiring policy for women and another for
men-each having pre-school-age children."3 4 But even while so
holding, the Marietta court nevertheless suggested that "the exist-
ence ... of family obligations, if demonstrably more relevant to job
performance for women than for men, could arguably be a basis for
distinction under [Title VII]." The Court then remanded the case
for fuller development of the evidence on that question. In that
way, the Court actually "[fell] into the trap of assuming that the Act
permits ancient canards about the proper role of women [i.e., that
women's "family obligations" are relevantly different from men's]
to be a basis for discrimination." 35 Applying the Marietta principle,
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in another "sex-plus" case,
36
Sprogis v. United Air Lines, 37 held it impermissible for an employer to
limit hiring of married women while hiring men without regard to
their marital status.
31. 692 F.2d at 610. It should be borne in mind, however, that the court in Gerdom H
was considering only the pre-19 73 requirements, i.e., those that were in force while the
flight attendant position was restricted to females. See supra note 25. It was on that basis
that the Gerdom H court found that "[a] facial examination of the weight program here
reveals that it is designed to apply only to females." 692 F.2d at 608. And it was on the
basis of that finding that the Gerdom H court found a prima facie case of discrimination.
692 F.2d at 608. It is not clear how the Gerdom H court would have approached a chal-
lenge to the post-1973 weight requirements.
32. See, e.g., Fertig v. Hillel, No. 79 Civ. 607E (W.D.N.Y. 1987), infra notes 51-57 and
accompanying text.
33. 400 U.S. 542 (1971).
34. 400 U.S. at 544.
35. 400 U.S. at 545 (Marshall, J., concurring).
36. "Sex-plus" is used here to refer to cases where application of the non-suspect
criterion is explicitly conditioned on gender (e.g., marital status is relevant only if the
job applicant is female).
37. 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971).
257
Yale Law & Policy Review
While these holdings properly prohibit application of a double
standard to men and women, the opinions fail to articulate the way
in which the meaning of the non-suspect characteristic (parenthood
or marital status) is transformed by its combination with the suspect
characteristic of femaleness. The opinions do not address the real-
ity that motherhood has different stereotypic meaning than father-
hood and that marriage has different stereotypic connotations for
women than for men. The opinions fail to address the fact that this
stereotypic alchemy-this transformation of the non-suspect charac-
teristic into a discriminatory criterion-underlies the employers'
discriminatory practices. This failure has inevitably resulted in in-
consistent antidiscrimination protection in cases involving non-sus-
pect criteria that have been transformed by their combination with a
suspect characteristic.
In fact, drawing on the reasoning in Jefferies and in the sex-plus
cases such as Phillips and Sprogis, the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia specifically repudiated the provision of
legal protection in cases involving a combination of suspect and
non-suspect characteristics. That court, in Judge v. Marsh, stated:
Extrapolating from . . . "sex-plus" cases, the Fifth Circuit has deter-
mined [inJefferies] that black women are a distinct subgroup, protected
by Title VII. This outcome is logical .... Race discrimination directed
solely at women is not less invidious because of its specificity .... The
difficulty with this position is that it turns employment discrimination
into a many-headed Hydra, impossible to contain within Title VII's
prohibition .... For this reason, theJefferies analysis is appropriately
limited to employment decisions based on one protected, immutable
trait or fundamental right, which are directed against individuals shar-
ing a second protected, immutable characteristic.38
Thus, the court in Marsh asserted that protection should be pro-
vided only for double-suspect classes or for classes defined by a
combination of. a suspect characteristic and a fundamental right
(e.g., gender plus parenthood or marital status). That proposed
limitation of the Jefferies analysis fails to recognize that a non-sus-
pect, nonfundamental-right "second" characteristic-such as
weight-may be transformed by its combination with a suspect char-
acteristic. Adoption of the limitation suggested in Marsh would ac-
tually prohibit legal recognition of discrimination stemming from
38. 649 F. Supp. 770, 780 (D.D.C. 1986) (citations omitted). In Marsh, a black fe-
male employee of the United States Army brought a Title VII action claiming that she
had been denied promotion based on race and gender discrimination. The court held
for the Army, finding that the promotion decision was based not on discriminatory crite-




transformation of a non-suspect characteristic. That prohibition
would establish a policy of permitting the presence of a non-suspect
criterion to mask the influence of a suspect criterion in cases involv-
ing transformative stereotyping. Such a policy would pose a formi-
dable obstacle to the effective functioning of antidiscrimination law.
An explicit adoption of a doctrine of transformative stereotyping
would preclude doctrinal development in the direction suggested in
Marsh. The theory of transformative stereotyping establishes that
the introduction of a non-suspect criterion does not negate the in-
fluence of the suspect criterion. Rather, the transformation may
often run in the other direction; the suspect characteristic may
transform and render discriminatory the non-suspect characteristic.
Explicit articulation of the transformative stereotyping doctrine
would permit focused investigation and rigorously reasoned hold-
ings in cases alleging transformative stereotyping and would,
thereby, facilitate consistent antidiscrimination protection.
III. Personality Traits as Non-Suspect Characteristics
The transformation of objectively measurable characteristics-
such as weight-is only one part of transformative stereotyping. An
additional complication arises from the fact that stereotypes are
composed largely of personality trait characterizations. Personality
traits are not generally measured through "objective" tests but
rather through more subjective means such as personal interactions,
job interviews, and supervisors' ratings.
The stereotypic meaning of a personality trait, just like the mean-
ing of an objective trait, may be transformed by its combination with
a suspect characteristic. The personality trait is the non-suspect
characteristic (like "overweight" in Gerdom) whose meaning is trans-
formed by its combination with the suspect characteristic. The traits
are different, but the alchemy is the same.
The process of stereotypically transforming personality traits op-
erates in two ways. First, the stereotyper may evaluate the personal-
ity traits of a member of a suspect class in a biased way consistent
with the stereotype attributed to the suspect group. 39 For instance,
a trait that might be positively evaluated as frugality in a Gentile
might be negatively evaluated as "cheapness" in a Jew.40 Through
39. See R. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure 475-90 (1949).
40. Id. at 482-83.
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this process of biased evaluation, the stereotypic meaning of person-
ality traits may be transformed by their combination with a suspect
characteristic.
Alternatively, stereotypic personality transformation may occur
through a process of biased interpretation in which the stereotyper
assumes the existence of personality traits that are not actually pres-
ent. Such inaccurate perceptions occur when the interpretation of
an individual's behavior is prejudiced by the stereotypic expecta-
tions of the stereotyper. 4 1 Thus, for example, angry shouts by a
black person might be interpreted as revealing a violent personal-
ity-consistent with a stereotype of blacks-when in reality the indi-
vidual in question is not violent at all. In this way, the meaning of
the individual's behavior would be transformed by the individual's
membership in the suspect class, blacks.
In either scenario, "biased evaluation" or "biased interpretation,"
the non-suspect criterion, personality, is transformed into a discrim-
inatory criterion by its combination with a suspect characteristic.
The resulting negative personality characterization and subsequent
rejection of the individual is the result of stereotyping and is, there-
fore, a form of discrimination against a suspect class.
Although federal courts have shown some willingness to recog-
nize discrimination based on stereotypic personality characteriza-
tions, there has yet to be a clear articulation of the transformative
stereotyping dynamics that form the basis of such discrimination.
The case of Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse,42 heard by the United States
Supreme Court during the 1988 Fall Term, provides a good exam-
ple. Hopkins claimed that she had been denied promotion at Price
Waterhouse because her employers found her personality objec-
tionable, although they would have found the same traits unobjec-
tionable in a male. In support of that claim, Hopkins presented
three principal types of evidence: (1) the comments partners made
about Hopkins herself, including comments that she was "macho"
41. See Greenberg & Rosenfield, Whites' Ethnocentrism and Their Attributions for
the Behavior of Blacks: A Motivational Bias, 47 J. Personality 643 (1979); Pettigrew, The
Ultimate Attribution Error: Extending Allport's Cognitive Analysis of Prejudice, 5 Per-
sonality & Soc. Psychology Bull. 461 (1979). See also Lawrence, supra note 2, at 343.
Lawrence observes that this process of biased interpretation may also function to disad-
vantage suspect classes indirectly through the operation of positive bias toward the fa-
vored group. Lawrence gives this example: "[An individual may select a white job
applicant over an equally qualified black and honestly believe that this decision was
based on observed intangibles unrelated to race. The employer perceives the white can-
didate as 'more articulate,' 'more collegial,' 'more thoughtful,' or 'more charismatic.' He
is unaware of the learned stereotype that influenced his decision."




and "a masculine, hard-nosed manager"; (2) the testimony of an ex-
pert in the field of stereotyping, who identified some of these com-
ments as the product of sexual stereotyping; and (3) comments
made about other women candidates in previous years.43
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
affirmed the District Court's ruling that held Price Waterhouse lia-
ble for sex discrimination in violation of Title VII. Based on the
evidence presented, the Court of Appeals concluded that "there is
ample support in the record for the District Court's finding that the
partnership selection process at Price Waterhouse was impermissi-
bly infected by stereotypical attitudes toward female candidates."-44
Implicit in the holdings of the District Court and the Court of Ap-
peals is a recognition that the non-suspect criterion, personality,
functioned as a vehicle for discrimination against women. However,
neither court made explicit the principle, crucial for consistent anti-
discrimination protection, that application of a non-suspect crite-
rion should not be allowed to mask the influence of the suspect
criterion. Neither court clearly articulated the type of discrimina-
tion to which Hopkins was subjected: a non-suspect criterion (per-
sonality) was applied to a member of a suspect class (females) in
such a way that the non-suspect criterion was transformed into a
discriminatory criterion. The problem was not that the partners
"stereotyped" Hopkins in a vacuum and then, separately and inde-
pendently of that stereotyping, disliked her personality. The part-
ners' views of Hopkins's personality were an integral part of the
stereotyping process.
Hopkins may have been the victim of biased evaluation wherein
her aggressive personality traits were disparaged as "macho" and
"hard-nosed," whereas a man with those personality traits might
have been evaluated as assertive or as "a go-getter." 45 Alterna-
tively, this may have been a case of biased interpretation, whereby
aggressive personality traits were erroneously attributed to Hopkins
in accordance with her evaluators' stereotypic images of business-
women. In either case, the non-suspect criterion of personality was
43. 825 F.2d at 465.
44. 825 F.2d at 468 (referring to the district court opinion at 618 F. Supp. 1109
(D.D.C. 1985)).
45. In a study in which male and female subjects rated the degree to which various
personality attributes applied to men and women, subjects rated men as more ambi-
tious, aggressive, and independent than women. Miller, Gender Stereotypes and Per-
ceptions of Occupational Success, in Women and Work: Selected Papers (M. Knezek, M.
Barrett & S. Collins eds. 1985).
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transformed into a discriminatory criterion by its combination with
the suspect characteristic of femaleness.
Neither of the lower courts enunciated the transformative stereo-
typing principle: that use of a non-suspect criterion does not negate
the influence of the suspect characteristic but, quite the reverse, the
transformative influence of the suspect characteristic inculpates the
use of the non-suspect criterion. Whether the Supreme Court will
make any movement toward recognizing transformative stereotyp-
ing in their Price Waterhouse opinion is unknown at the time of this
writing.
A doctrine of stereotypic personality transformation would be ap-
plicable not only in the context of single-suspect class stereotypes,
such as the gender stereotype in Price Waterhouse, but also in the con-
text of double-suspect class stereotypes, such as stereotypes that
characterize Jewish mothers as "smothering," 46 or "Jewish Ameri-
can Princesses" ("JAPs") as "spoiled." 47 In fact, the theory of stere-
otypic personality transformation is particularly relevant to
stereotypes of double-suspect classes because stereotyping is more
potent as the stereotyped class becomes more narrowly defined.48
That is, a clearer stereotypic image can be invoked of a more specific
group, such as "black women" as compared to "blacks." Very
highly specified classes, such as "JAPs" and Jewish mothers, which
include specifications as to ethnicity, gender, and age, invoke very
highly elaborated personality stereotypes. 49 Thus, the more highly
specified the class, the more elaborated its personality stereotype
and the greater its vulnerability to discrimination based on stereo-
typic personality transformation. 50
46. See, e.g., D. Greenberg, How to Be a Jewish Mother (1964); P. Roth, supra note
22.
47. See, e.g., D. Lukatsky & S. Toback, The Jewish American Princess Handbook
(1982); A. Sequoia, The Official J.A.P. Handbook (1982).
48. See G. Rothbell, supra note 19, ch. 1, at 8 passim.
49. Id.
50. Courts should be particularly vigilant in providing protection for composite sus-
pect classes. To be consistent with equal protection doctrine and particularly the doc-
trine arising from footnote four of United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S.
144, 152 n.4 (1937), the more discrete and insular the minority, the greater the judicial
protection required. Composite suspect classes are even more discrete and insular than
single-suspect classes.
As a subgroup of each of its constitutive unitary classes (e.g., black women are a sub-
group of both blacks and women), a composite class is necessarily numerically weaker
than each of its constitutive unitary classes. Moreover, composite classes often lack the
support or protection of their constitutive classes. For example, the Antidefamation
League of B'nai Brith has not addressed the Jewish Mother stereotype as defamation of
Jews (see G. Rothbell, supra note 19, ch. 7, at 40)-whereas Lilith Magazine, a "Jewish




Consider, for example, the case of Fertig v. Hillel. 5 Fertig, a 52
year old Jewish woman, brought an age discrimination claim under
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 52 after being fired from
her job as secretary at the Hillel House at the State University of
New York at Buffalo. Fertig testified that Rabbi Wolfe had said that
he was firing her because he did not like her "old Jewish mother
image" around the Hillel house.53 Rabbi Wolfe explained at trial
that by "Jewish mother image" he meant the image of someone who
is "overbearing, talks a lot, smothers people, [and is]
overassisting." 54
The district judge in Fertig held that "[Rabbi] Wolfe's use of the
term 'old Jewish mother image' is . . . insufficient to prove that age
17 Lilith Mag. 9 (1987). Relatively advantaged members of the constituent classes may
actually dissociate themselves from the most disadvantaged class members in order to
reduce their own stigmatization by distinguishing themselves from the "undesirable"
members of their group (e.g., second-generation American Jews participating in the
denigration of newly arrived "Greenhorns"). See G. Rothbell, supra note 19, ch. 1, at 10
passim. As Justice Marshall observed in his concurrence in Castaneda v. Partida:
Social scientists agree that members of minority groups frequently respond to dis-
crimination and prejudice by attempting to disassociate themselves from the group,
even to the point of adopting the majority's negative attitudes towards the minority.
Such behavior occurs with particular frequency among members of minority groups
who have achieved some measure of economic or political success and thereby have
gained some acceptability among the dominant group.
430 U.S. 482, 503 (1977).
By virtue of their stigmatization by both "society at large" and their own constitutive
classes, composite suspect classes are the ultimate "discrete and insular minority."
Therefore, such classes should receive the utmost judicial protection. See Carotene Prod-
ucts, 304 U.S. at 152 n.4.
51. No. 79 Civ. 607E (W.D.N.Y. 1987).
52. 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. (1982).
53. No. 79 Civ. 607E at 7. In addition to his own dislike of Fertig's "Jewish mother
image," Rabbi Wolfe also suggested that the image might "turn off" students who
would otherwise participate in Hillel activities. No. 79 Civ. 607E at 8. Rabbi Wolfe's
"customers' tastes" claim is basically that, although an employer may not act based on
his own prejudices, business necessity requires that an employer accommodate the
prejudices of his customers. Under such an argument, if the customers of a particular
restaurant prefer that their food be served by whites, then the employer can discriminate
against blacks when hiring waiters; that is, in this restaurant, blackness interferes with
job performance. But such employer acquiescence to the "bigot's veto" (Fiss, A Theory
of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. Chi. L. Rev. 235, 260 (1971) (citing H. Kalven,Jr., The
Negro and the First Amendment 140-60 (1965))) has been held impermissible. See, e.g.,
Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, 442 F.2d 385 (alleged customer preference for
female flight attendants held to be an impermissible basis for rejecting male applicants
for employment as flight attendants); Gerdom 11, 692 F.2d 602 (gender-based discrimina-
tion cannot be upheld on the basis of customer preferences unrelated to abilities to
perform the job).
Acquiescence to the bigot's veto has also been held impermissible in the constitutional
context. See, e.g., Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984) (stating that "[p]rivate
biases may be outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give
them effect").
54. Fertig, No. 79 Civ. 607E at 12.
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had been a determining factor in the plaintiffs employment termi-
nation." 55 The judge was right: Fertig's firing could not accurately
be called, simply, "age discrimination." Rather, what was being ap-
plied to Fertig was the stereotype of the triple-suspect class (ethnic-
ity, gender, and age) of "Jewish mothers." In using the term
"Jewish mother image" Rabbi Wolfe acknowledged that the phrase
"Jewish mother" was intended to invoke a particular stereotypic
"image." When Rabbi Wolfe was questioned as to what he meant
by "Jewish mother image," he described the content of that stereo-
type by listing personality traits. 5 6 It appears that Fertig was fired
on the basis of stereotypic personality transformation. 57 Her firing
might be analogized to firing an older black male employee of the
NAACP for having an "Uncle Tom image." Both firings would be
based upon personality stereotypes of groups defined by gender,
age, and ethnicity/race. Such stereotype-based firing violates the
principles of antidiscrimination law. Yet Fertig was unable to find
redress for her grievances in the courts. No available theory of an-
tidiscrimination law was found applicable to the form of discrimina-
tion she had suffered. The theory of stereotypic personality
transformation proposed in this Current Topic provides a legal ve-
hicle for redressing that form of discrimination.
The theory of stereotypic personality transformation proposes
that when such transformation leads to rejection of an individual,
that rejection is a form of discrimination. This theory of personality
transformation is part of the larger theory of transformative stereo-
types set forth in this Current Topic. This broader theory recog-
nizes, generally, that the stereotypic meaning of characteristics may
be transformed by their combination with other characteristics.
55. No. 79 Civ. 607E at 16-17. The court also considered issues regarding Fertig's
qualifications, but those issues are not relevant to the court's failure to recognize the
transformative stereotyping dynamic that was operative.
56. No. 79 Civ. 607E at 7. It should be noted that Fertig may not in fact have had
the personality traits attributed to her. Rabbi Wolfe may have erroneously assumed 'the
existence of those traits through .the process of biased interpretation. Even assuming
arguendo the objective existence of the personality traits in question, it remains possible
that the Rabbi's evaluation of those traits may have been biased by their combination
with the suspect class "Jewish mothers." As discussed above, personality traits are eval-
uated in the context of those traits being held by particular individuals who evoke partic-
ular stereotypic images. See supra text accompanying notes 39-40. Personality traits are
therefore subject to biased evaluation. In the Fertig case, Rabbi Wolfe might have evalu-
ated Fertig's personality as very helpful, articulate, assertive, and warm. Instead, he
evaluated her personality as "overassisting, ... overbearing and smothering." No. 79
Civ. 607E at 12.
57. An evidentiary hearing would be required to determine whether the firing was in
fact stereotype-based. Methods of establishing liability for stereotype-based discrimina-




This transformative dynamic may cause double-suspect classes to be
subject to stereotypes distinct from those of their constitutive
classes. Moreover, not only are suspect characteristics subject to
transformation, but non-suspect characteristics may be transformed
into discriminatory criteria by their combination with suspect char-
acteristics. Finally, the theory of transformative stereotyping recog-
nizes that both objective non-suspect haracteristics (e.g., weight),
and subjective characteristics (e.g., personality) may be transformed
into discriminatory criteria.
IV Establishing Liability
To function effectively as an apparatus for legal cognition of
stereotype-based discrimination, the theory of transformative
stereotyping requires workable methods of establishing liability
under the theory. What constitutes proof that a non-suspect charac-
teristic has been "transformed"? How can one prove, for example,
that stereotypic personality transformation has formed the basis for
an employment decision? Conversely, how can an employer re-
jecting a member of a suspect class on the basis of personality ever
prove that transformative stereotyping did not form the basis for the
rejection? This latter difficulty was pointed to by Judge Williams in
his dissent in Price Waterhouse. Judge Williams asserted:
To [the expert witness in this case] it seems plain that no woman could
be overbearing, arrogant or abrasive: any observations to that effect
would necessarily be discounted as the product of stereotyping. If
analysis like this is to prevail in federal courts, no employer can base
any adverse action as to a woman on such attributes. 58
Legal cognition of transformative stereotyping, however, need not
lead to the undesirable state of affairs described by Judge Williams.
An adapted version of the traditional methods of establishing liabil-
ity for discrimination would be effective in cases involving transfor-
mation of a non-suspect characteristic.
Traditionally, there have been two basic methods of establishing
liability for discrimination against a suspect class: proof of disparate
impact and proof of discriminatory treatment. Proof of either dispa-
rate impact or discriminatory treatment is sufficient to sustain a dis-
crimination claim under Title VII, 5 9 whereas a showing of
discriminatory treatment is required to sustain constitutional (equal
265
58. 825 F.2d at 477 (Williams, J., dissenting).
59. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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protection or due process) claims. 60 Both of these traditional meth-
ods of establishing liability would be applicable to discrimination
cases involving transformation of a non-suspect characteristic.
A. Disparate Impact Analysis
In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 6 ' a disparate impact case brought
under Title VII, the Court specified that use of an employment cri-
terion that has a disparate impact on a suspect class will be consid-
ered discriminatory when the criterion is not relevant to job
performance. In Griggs, the employer had used high school gradua-
tion and standardized intelligence test results as hiring criteria. The
Court held that use of such criteria was impermissible under Title
VII because it had a disparate impact on black job-seekers and had
no "manifest relationship" to an individual's capacity to perform the
jobs in question. 62 Successfuljob performance does not include sat-
isfying the employer's personal tastes or preferences. Rather, a
characteristic is construed as not interfering with successful job per-
formance unless by hiring applicants with that characteristic "the es-
sence of the business operation would be undermined .... ,,63 Thus,
under disparate impact analysis, even non-suspect criteria are im-
permissible if they function disproportionately to disadvantage a
suspect class and cannot be justified by business necessity.
The applicability of disparate impact analysis was extended in
Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust.64 In Watson, the Court held that
not only objective employment criteria, such as standardized tests or
height and weight requirements, but also subjective criteria, such as
supervisors' evaluations of an employee's tact or loyalty, could be
subject to disparate impact analysis. In so holding, the Court noted
that failure to include subjective criteria within the scope of dispa-
rate impact analysis would "largely ... nullifly]" the antidiscrimina-
tion principles upheld in Griggs.65 Exemption of subjective criteria
from disparate impact analysis would permit an employer to escape
60. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
61. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
62. 401 U.S. at 432. The job-relatedness of many employment criteria can be tested
through "formal validation studies which seek to determine whether discrete selection
criteria predict actual on-the-job performance." Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust,
108 S. Ct. 2777, 2787 (1988) (citing Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 429-
36 (1975)).
63. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 333 (1977) (quoting Diaz v. Pan American
World Airways, 422 F.2d at 388).
64. 108 S. Ct. 2777 (1988).




liability for discriminatory impact simply by adding any subjective
element to its employment criteria. The Court observed:
So long as an employer refrained from making standardized criteria
absolutely determinative, it would remain free to give such tests al-
most as much weight as it chose without risking a disparate impact
challenge. If we announced a rule that allowed employers so easily to
insulate themselves from liability under Griggs, disparate impact analy-
sis might effectively be abolished. 66
Thus, under Griggs and Watson, disparate impact analysis is appli-
cable to both objective and subjective criteria. A non-suspect crite-
rion-objective or subjective-is impermissible if it functions to
disadvantage a suspect class and is not demonstrably job-related.
Disparate impact analysis provides a readily applicable method for
establishing liability in cases involving a combination of suspect and
non-suspect characteristics. 67 Under disparate impact analysis, the
complainant must demonstrate that application of a particular non-
suspect criterion has a disparate impact on the suspect class in-
volved. Proof that the non-suspect criterion was transformed would
be unnecessary. The showing of disparate impact-the disparate re-
sult-supplants the need to demonstrate the transformative dy-
namic which caused that result. This exemption from the need to
prove discriminatory intent may be crucial in cases where the dis-
crimination involved stemmed from subtle forms of prejudice, such
as "biased interpretation" and "biased evaluation." 68
The Supreme Court pointed to the importance of disparate im-
pact analysis in dealing with subtler forms of discrimination when it
extended disparate impact analysis' to cover subjective criteria in
Watson. There the Court stated: "[E]ven if one assumed that [inten-
tional] discrimination can be adequately policed through disparate
treatment analysis, the problem of subconscious stereotypes and
prejudice would remain." 69
In applying disparate impact analysis to a personality criterion
such as that applied in the Price Waterhouse case, 70 the complainant
would establish the existence of disparate impact by a statistical
66. 108 S. Ct. at 2786.
67. For a discussion of the related topic of applying disparate impact analysis to
cases where gender stereotyping creates bias in employer perceptions of job descrip-
tions and qualifications rather than of job applicants, see Note, Getting Women Work
That Isn't Women's Work: Challenging Gender Biases in the Workplace Under Title
VII, 97 Yale LJ. 1397 (1988).
68. See supra text accompanying notes 39-41.
69. 108 S. Ct. at 2786.
70. In reality, Hopkins did not bring her case against Price Waterhouse as a dispa-
rate impact case, but rather as a discriminatory treatment case. This was probably in
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showing that female employees were disproportionately excluded
from partnership on the basis of that personality criterion. A prima
facie case having thus been established, the burden would shift to
the employer to demonstrate that use of that personality criterion
was a business necessity. Unless the employer were able to demon-
strate that the personality criterion was legitimately job-related, that
criterion would be found to be impermissible as applied.
Thus, disparate impact analysis is well-suited for establishing lia-
bility in many cases involving combinations of suspect and non-sus-
pect characteristics. 71 Disparate impact analysis might even be
thought of as a streamlined vehicle in such cases, since it does not
require proof that the non-suspect characteristic was transformed.
In fact, if disparate impact analysis were applicable in all cases, there
would be little need for a theory of transformative stereotypes. But
this is not the case; disparate impact analysis is inapplicable to many
potential discrimination claims. For instance, proof of disparate im-
pact is not legally sufficient to sustain a constitutional claim of discrim-
ination.7 2 Also, even in the statutory context, many cases involve
numbers too small for application of disparate impact analysis. In
the context of employment discrimination, for example, the com-
pany involved may have too few employees to allow for the type of
statistical analysis generally required to show disparate impact.
Even in large companies, the number of employees at the relevant
level-at the managerial level, for instance-may be too small to be
part because of the problem of small numbers, discussed below. See infra, text accompa-
nying note 73.
71. The court in Gerdom If found Continental liable under a theory of discriminatory
treatment. Application of disparate impact analysis to Gerdom II would have raised the
complex issue of how disparate impact analysis would apply in cases where challenged
employment criteria are imposed upon a job classification which is itself segregated by
sex, race, or any other suspect classification. The court in Gerdom H specified that it did
"not reach the applicability of disparate impact analysis to [such situations]." 692 F.2d
at 605.
72. The Supreme Court stated in Washington v. Davis that a showing of discrimina-
tory purpose shall be required to prove discrimination in constitutional claims under the
equal protection and due process clauses. 426 U.S. at 238-42, The Washington v. Davis
standard was reiterated in Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney: "[Elven if a neutral law
has a disproportionately adverse effect upon a racial minority, it is unconstitutional
under the Equal Protection Clause only if that impact can be traced to a discriminatory
purpose." 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1978).
Professor Lawrence, observing that racist intent may often be unconscious, has pro-
posed a method for legally cognizing unconscious racism while still fulfilling the inten-





susceptible to statistical analysis. 73 In those cases where disparate
impact analysis is inapplicable or inappropriate, application of the
second traditional method of proof, proof of discriminatory treat-
ment, is necessary.74
B. Discriminatory Treatment Analysis
In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,75 the Court delineated the fol-
lowing standards and procedures to be employed in proving dis-
criminatory treatment. The complainant may establish a prima facie
case of discrimination by showing (1) that he or she belongs to a
suspect class; (2) that he or she was qualified for the position in
question but was nonetheless rejected; and (3) that, after his or her
73. In the case of double-suspect classes, the problem of small numbers will be exac-
erbated since, for example, the number of black women in a firm will be even smaller
than the number of blacks or the number of women in the firm.
Also weighing against the use of disparate impact analysis in some cases is the possi-
bility that the non-job-relatedness of subjective criteria may be difficult to prove. Within
the Watson opinion itself there is evidence of ambiguity and perhaps conflict regarding
the standards of proof to be applied to claims of discriminatory impact involving subjec-
tive criteria. The plurality opinion in Watson stated, "In the context of subjective or
discretionary employment decisions, the employer will often find it easier than in the
case of standardized tests to produce evidence of'a manifest relationship to the employ-
ment in question.' " 108 S. Ct. at 2791. Justice Blackmun, in a concurrence joined by
Justices Brennan and Marshall, evinced a different tone. He asserted, "[I]t is clearly not
enough for an employer merely to produce evidence that the method of selection is job-
related. It is the employer's obligation to persuade the reviewing court of this fact." 108
S. Ct. at 2795. The standards of proof that are ultimately adopted may prove crucial in
determining the utility of disparate impact analysis for future antidiscrimination litiga-
tion involving subjective criteria.
For a discussion of methods for validating the job-relatedness of subjective employ-
ment criteria, see Watson, 108 S. Ct. at 2795 (Blackmun, J., concurring). See also Brito v.
Zia Co., 478 F.2d 1200 (10th Cir. 1973) (holding that subjective observations by em-
ployer of minority employees had to be supported by empirical evidence of validity);
Friedman & Williams, Current Use of Tests for Employment, in 2 Ability Testing: Uses,
Consequences and Controversies 99-100 (A. Wigdor & W. Garner eds. 1982) (acknowl-
edging that the definition of selection procedures has extended to the full range of as-
sessment devices, including interviews, and that all the devices are to be scrutinized
according to the same guidelines used to evaluate standardized tests). See generally
Bartholet, Application of Title VII to jobs in High Places, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 947, 987-988
(1982) (discussing the application of disparate impact analysis to subjective criteria).
74. In International Bd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977), the
Supreme Court compared disparate impact and discriminatory treatment analysis. The
Court explained that disparate impact claims "involve employment practices that are
facially neutral in their treatment of different groups but that in fact fall more harshly on
one group than another and cannot be justified by business necessity. . . . Proof of
discriminatory motive ... is not required under a disparate-impact theory." 431 U.S. at
335-36 n.15. In contrast, the Court described discriminatory treatment as arising when
an "employer simply treats some people less favorably than others because of their race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin. Proof of discriminatory motive is critical,
although it can in some situations be inferred from the mere fact of differences in treat-
ment." 431 U.S. at 335-36 n.15.
75. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
269
Yale Law & Policy Review
rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued
to seek applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications.
Once the complainant has thus established a prima facie case of dis-
criminatory treatment, the burden shifts to the employer to "articu-
late some legitimate nondiscriminatory reason" for the employment
decision. If the employer successfully articulates such a reason, the
burden then shifts back to the complainant to show that the stated
reason was in fact pretextual.76 If the employer is able to demon-
strate a non-pretextual "nondiscriminatory reason" for the chal-
lenged decision, then the decision is considered legitimate
notwithstanding the disadvantageous effect on the complainant.
The discriminatory treatment method of establishing liability is
readily applicable to cases involving a combination of suspect and
non-suspect characteristics. For example, in a case like Gerdom, 77 the
complainant would first establish a prima facie case by showing
(1) that she belongs to a suspect class (female); (2) that she was
qualified for the flight attendant job by all criteria other than the
allegedly discriminatory criterion (weight); (3) that, despite her
qualifications, she was dismissed; and (4) that, after her dismissal,
the position remained open and was available to applicants with
complainant's qualifications.
Once Gerdom had established a prima facie case, the burden
would shift to the airline to articulate some legitimate non-discrimi-
natory reason for the dismissal. The airline would, presumably, put
forward the non-suspect criterion of weight. At this point, following
the McDonnell Douglas procedures, the burden would shift back to
the complainant to demonstrate that the stated reason was pretex-
tual. In a discriminatory non-suspect criterion case, however, the
complainant would not then show that the reason was pretextual.
Rather, the complainant would show that the stated criterion was
itself discriminatory as applied. The complainant would demon-
strate that the meaning of the non-suspect characteristic of weight
76. 411 U.S. at 802, 804.
77. The court in Gerdom II ultimately considered a challenge to only the pre-1973
weight requirements that were in force while the flight attendant position was exclu-
sively female. See supra note 25. The method of applying discriminatory treatment anal-
ysis presented here would be applicable not only in challenging the pre-19 7 3 policies,
but also in challenging the weight policies that were in force after 1973, when there were




was transformed by its combination with gender and that the trans-
formed, gender-specific meaning of "weight" was applied as an em-
ployment criterion. 78
Once the complainant had demonstrated that the non-suspect cri-
terion had been transformed by its combination with the suspect
characteristic, the employer would have an opportunity to show that
it was not the stereotypic meaning of the criterion that was operative
in the employment decision but rather a job-related application of
the criterion. In Gerdom, for example, the employer might have ar-
gued that the weight criterion was related to the airline's interest in
having physically fit flight attendants to assist in emergency situa-
tions and rescue operations. Where a court was presented with such
competing explanations for the application of a criterion, the court
would decide whether the criterion was used "at least in part be-
cause of, not merely in spite of" 79 its stereotypic implications. If the
court determined that the stereotypic implications of the criterion
had formed at least part of the basis for using the criterion, then the
court would render a finding of discriminatory treatment.
Not only is discriminatory treatment analysis readily applicable to
cases involving stereotypic transformation of an objective non-sus-
pect criterion, it is also applicable to cases involving a subjective
non-suspect criterion, such as personality. In demonstrating the
78. Support for this showing could include the three types of evidence used by Hop-
kins in Price Waterhouse: relevant comments by the employer about the complainant, rele-
vant comments by the employer about previous employees, and expert testimony
interpreting the stereotypic significance of those comments. 825 F.2d at 465. Another
approach to proving the existence of particular stereotypic meanings is Lawrence's "cul-
tural meaning" test. Lawrence proposes "a test that would look to the 'cultural mean-
ing' of an allegedly racially discriminatory act as the best available analogue for and
evidence of the collective unconscious that we cannot observe directly. This test would
evaluate.., conduct to see if it conveys a symbolic message to which the culture attaches
racial significance.... If the court determined by a preponderance of the evidence that
a significant portion of the population thinks of the . . . action in racial terms, then it
would presume that socially shared, unconscious racial attitudes made evident by the
action's meaning had influenced the decisionmakers." Lawrence, supra note 2, at 355-
56.
As discussed above, see supra note 53, customer preferences-such as a customer pref-
erence for thin female flight attendants-are not sufficient to legitimate a criterion chal-
lenged as discriminatory.
79. Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279 (stating that "discrimina-
tory purpose" "implies that the decisionmaker ... selected. . . a course of action at least
in part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an identifiable
group." The court did not find discriminatory purpose in the Feeney case because, it
asserted, "nothing in the record demonstrates that this preference for veterans was ...
enacted because it would accomplish the collateral goal of keeping women in a stereo-
typic and predefined place .. ") 442 U.S. at 279.
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transformation of a subjective non-suspect characteristic, the com-
plainant would, as with objective criteria, be required to demon-
strate that the criterion in question had been transformed by its
combination with a suspect characteristic and was therefore discrim-
inatory as applied.
For example, in the Fertig case, Fertig would have to demonstrate
that the personality traits that Rabbi Wolfe attributed to her were
part of the stereotype of the triple-suspect class ofJewish mothers.
Fertig could use various types of evidence to delineate the personal-
ity characterizations in that stereotype, including the three types
used in Price Waterhouse:80 relevant comments by the employer; so-
cial scientific data, perhaps presented by an expert witness; and
comments made about other "Jewish mothers" by the employer. In
Fertig, comments made by the respondent would have been particu-
larly powerful evidence since Rabbi Wolfe himself told the court
that it was the personality characteristics constituting Fertig's "Jew-
ish mother image" that he disliked."'
Fertig could take two approaches to proving that stereotypic im-
plications of the personality criteria were operative in the Rabbi's
decision to fire her. She could argue that she does not have the
personality traits alleged and that Rabbi Wolfe misinterpreted her
behavior to conform to stereotypical expectations regarding her
personality. That is, she could claim biased interpretation. Alterna-
tively, Fertig could argue that the Rabbi was engaged in biased eval-
uation whereby he took a negative view of her personality traits
when he would have evaluated the same traits positively in a non-
member of the Jewish mother class. In either case, Fertig would
argue that when the Rabbi applied the personality-trait criteria to
her he did so in a biased way based upon his stereotypical image of
the suspect class "Jewish mothers." Therefore, Fertig would con-
clude, the non-suspect criterion of personality had been trans-
formed into a discriminatory criterion, and by applying that
discriminatory criterion, Rabbi Wolfe had engaged in discriminatory
treatment.
Thus, discrimination that occurs through the dynamic of trans-
formative stereotyping should be readily cognizable through proof
of discriminatory treatment. Stereotypic transformation of both ob-
jective and subjective non-suspect criteria can be legally recognized
80. 825 F.2d at 465.




using this adaptation of the traditional discriminatory treatment
method of establishing liability.
V Conclusion
The traditional methods for establishing liability for discrimina-
tion, disparate impact analysis and discriminatory treatment analy-
sis, provide a satisfactory apparatus for establishing liability in cases
involving combinations of suspect and non-suspect characteristics.
The efficacy of that apparatus depends upon the development of a
doctrine recognizing the possible transformation of non-suspect
characteristics. The theory of transformative stereotyping articu-
lates the basic concept that the stereotypic meaning of char-
acteristics-suspect or non-suspect-may be transformed by their
combination with other characteristics.
Where a suspect characteristic and a non-suspect characteristic
are combined and the non-suspect characteristic is transformed, the
non-suspect characteristic becomes a discriminatory criterion. Ap-
plication of that criterion is a form of discrimination against the sus-
pect class. The absence of a legal theory of transformative
stereotyping has resulted in inconsistent antidiscrimination protec-
tion in cases involving a combination of suspect and non-suspect
characteristics. Development of a doctrine of transformative stere-
otyping would provide an important tool for ensuring that the con-
stitutional and statutory guarantees of protection against
discrimination will be readily and consistently fulfilled.
273

